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IF YOU’RE READING THIS, IT’S TOO LATE: THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICE EFFECTUATING 
IMPLIED CONSENT† 
ABSTRACT 
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment; a search is per 
se unreasonable absent a warrant, but if the state has garnered consent from an 
individual, the subsequent search is deemed reasonable and not to have violated 
the Fourth Amendment. Because consent is a powerful exception, governments 
looking to establish valid search schemes are attempting to garner consent, 
specifically implied consent, by notifying individuals that specific actions will 
serve as consent to search. 
Such attempts are not rare. This Comment focuses on three examples: the 
Denver Police Department’s use of signs notifying individuals in particular 
areas that their biometric data is being gathered, the City of Bristol’s street signs 
notifying individuals that parking in public spots serves as consent to search 
their vehicles for parking enforcement purposes, and, most famously, implied 
consent laws claiming that the issuance of a driver’s license serves as consent 
to a breathalyzer test. These examples all illustrate government attempts to use 
notice to effectuate implied consent to search.  
This Comment argues that this approach to garnering implied consent to 
search is largely dishonest, despite the ubiquity of such laws in American 
society. The vast majority of attempts to use this approach do not comport with 
any definition of consent, especially not implied consent. Further, the Fourth 
Amendment’s consent exception requires a number of elements be met before 
consent can be satisfied. However, turning to the pervasively regulated 
industries exception for inspiration, this Comment proposes a four-element 
dispositive test to determine when notice can effectuate implied consent to 
search: tradition of search, consistency of search, revocability of consent, and 
most importantly, furthering of public safety. 
  
 
 † This Comment received the Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and 
Writing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 This right “belongs as much to the citizen 
on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose 
of his secret affairs.”2 “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of 
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.”3  
These epic proclamations make clear that no act or interest is too small to 
warrant protection under the Fourth Amendment. A recent case from the Sixth 
Circuit demonstrates just how far this sentiment goes. In Taylor v. City of 
Saginaw,4 the court held that the practice of tire chalking for parking 
enforcement purposes constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.5 In the 
aftermath of this case, parking enforcement officers subject to the law of the 
Sixth Circuit may6 need a warrant prior to chalking a vehicle’s tires.  
But in an interesting twist, not long after this decision was handed down, 
new signs began popping up on the streets of Bristol, Tennessee,7 a small town 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968). 
 3 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 4 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that use of chalk to mark tires 
to determine how long vehicles had been parked was a “search” within the definition of the Fourth Amendment, 
and that the city and officer failed to meet their burden of showing that marking tires fell within exception to 
warrant requirement.).  
 5 See Campbell Robertson, Lose the Chalk, Officer: Court Finds Marking Tires of Parked Cars 
Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/tire-chalk-parking-
unconstitutional.html. 
 6 Some scholars are suggesting that this case’s holding is much narrower than initially suspected. 
Because the ruling was based on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, some argue that the Court was holding only 
that the Plaintiff had in fact stated a plausible claim, and not making any substantive ruling on the 
constitutionality of the search. The Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion in which it states, “we hold that 
chalking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, specifically under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. 
This does not mean, however, that chalking violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we hold, based on the 
pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the ‘community caretaking’ 
exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this. When 
the record in this case moves beyond the pleadings stage, the City is, of course, free to argue anew that one or 
both of those exceptions do apply, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement might apply.” Taylor, 
922 F.3d at 336. 
 7 Blake Lipton, New Parking Signs to Notify People About Tire Chalking Come to Downtown Bristol, 
TN, WJHL NEWS CHANNEL 11 (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://www.wjhl.com/news/local/new-parking-signs-
to-notify-people-about-tire-chalking-come-to-downtown-bristol-tn/. 
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within the Sixth Circuit.8 These signs read, “By parking in timed spaces, you 
consent to your tires being chalked for parking enforcement.”9 In other words, 
after the court held a practice to be a violation of the people’s Fourth 
Amendment rights,10 the City of Bristol immediately used its authority to post 
signs that served to nullify the court’s decision by claiming to obtain implied 
consent from its citizens. This example begs an important question: can the state 
turn an unconstitutional search into a constitutional search simply by putting 
individuals on notice? 
Bristol, Tennessee’s use of signs to imply consent to search is neither the 
only nor the most serious attempt by a jurisdiction to do so. The Denver Police 
Department uses a surveillance system called the High Activity Location 
Observation system, or HALO.11 Employing 256 cameras around the city,12 the 
police are constantly monitoring almost every corner of Denver.13 While simply 
monitoring a city via pole camera surveillance is a constitutional practice,14 these 
cameras can now be combined with other software to cross-reference data they 
gather with other systems of biometric data collection and analysis to find people 
of interest.15 The Colorado Bureau of Investigations already has plans to 
 
 8 Geographical Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/Circuit%20Map.pdf. 
 9 Lipton, supra note 7 (quoting language directly from the sign pictured in the article). 
 10 The court later released a clarification stating that they did not necessarily decide that the practice of 
tire chalking was per se unconstitutional, rather that the practice constituted a search. See Orin Kerr, Chalking 
Tires and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:49 AM), https://reason.com/2019/04/ 
23/chalking-tires-and-the-fourth-amendment/. 
 11 Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, DENVER CHANNEL 
(July 9, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/360/facial-recognition-technology-does-it-
violate-privacy-or-protect-community-. 
 12 David Sachs, The Denver Police Essentially Have 256 Sentinel Robots Watching over the Streets, and 
Here’s Where You’ll Find Them, DENVERITE (Dec. 21, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://denverite.com/2018/12/21/the-
denver-police-essentially-have-256-sentinel-robots-watching-over-the-streets-and-heres-where-youll-find-
them/. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Thus, notwithstanding the 
concurrences in Jones and dicta in our unpublished opinion, the results in Knotts, Forest, and Skinner indicate 
that long-term warrantless surveillance via a stationary pole camera does not violate a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when it was possible for any member of the public to have observed the defendant’s activities 
during the surveillance period.”); see also Bob Farb, Pole Camera Surveillance Under the Fourth Amendment, 
N.C. CRIM. L. (July 12, 2016, 10:24 AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/pole-camera-surveillance-fourth-
amendment/ (“Nothing in Jones or lower court cases after Jones calls into question the use of surveillance 
cameras that are focused on public streets, parks, and other public areas. For example, if drug activity is 
commonplace at a particular intersection, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude placing a surveillance 
camera on a light pole facing that intersection.”). 
 15 See Const. Project’s Task Force on Facial Recognition Surveillance & Jake Laperruque, Facing the 
Future of Surveillance, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.pogo.org/report/2019/03/ 
facing-the-future-of-surveillance/#heading-8 (last visited Sept. 1, 2020) (“Such data could be used for an 
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combine the HALO system with software called Morpho Argus,16 a real-time 
video screening system that processes faces captured in live or recorded video,17 
to turn the HALO cameras from tools that monitor the public to tools that scan, 
collect, and store the biometric data of Denver’s citizens.18 All of this data is 
obtained without the express consent of its citizens. However, the city has posted 
signs stating, “Attention: This area is monitored by video cameras to enhance 
your safety and security.”19  
A third example animating the role notice plays in the Fourth Amendment is 
classic DUI implied consent laws. These statutes claim to confer consent to 
search via breathalyzer (and possibly blood test) through the issuance of a 
driver’s license. The statute provides the “notice,” which, combined with the 
issuance of the driver’s license, provides law enforcement with your “consent” 
to a breathalyzer test, should you be suspected of driving while intoxicated. 
While the constitutionality of these schemes has been questioned, they still exist 
in all fifty states today.20  
These three examples, although spanning the spectrum of technological 
sophistication, give rise to important questions about the meaning of implied 
consent and the role notice plays in the Fourth Amendment search equation. 
Where does the theory of implied consent fit within the Fourth Amendment?21 
Is notice alone enough to generate the implied consent to search?  
 
immense array of future government activities, ranging from profiling, to selective law enforcement 
investigations, to applications for background checks, to evaluations for civil service employment 
opportunities.”). 
 16 MorphoManager: Centralizing User Database and Biometric Terminal Management, IDEMIA, https:// 
www.idemia.com/morphomanager (last visited June 28, 2020).  
 17 Id.  
 18 Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11; cf. 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG 
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, at x (2014). The merging of data systems is drastically 
increasing law enforcement capabilities—this phenomenon is referred to as “data fusion.” Id. “Data fusion 
occurs when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge . . . . Individually, each 
data source may have a specific, limited purpose. Their combination, however, may uncover new meanings. In 
particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual people, the creation of profiles of an 
individual, and the tracking of an individual’s activities. More broadly, data analytics discovers patterns and 
correlations in large corpuses of data, using increasingly powerful statistical algorithms. If those data include 
personal data, the inferences flowing from data analytics may then be mapped back to inferences, both certain 
and uncertain, about individuals.” Id. 
 19 Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11. 
 20 Robert Voas, Tara Kelley-Baker, Eduardo Romano & Radha Vishnuvajjala, Implied-Consent Laws: A 
Review of the Literature and Examination of Current Problems and Related Statutes, 40 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 78 
(2009). 
 21 In a 1991 essay, Stephen Kruger argued that the doctrine of implied consent lacks any constitutional 
foundation whatsoever: “Whether the Search Clause should be read with Brennanite expansiveness or 
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The answers to these questions have important implications as legislatures 
begin creating laws regulating the collection of biometric data, and courts will 
undoubtedly begin hearing challenges to these laws almost as soon as they are 
enacted. Currently, there is no federal biometric data collection law, and only a 
few states have legislation regulating biometric data collection.22 Washington 
State is the next in line—Washington’s House of Representatives has drafted a 
bill regulating the gathering of biometric data that is currently working its way 
through the legislature.23 Before creating these laws, legislatures should have a 
concrete understanding of the role implied consent plays in various Fourth 
Amendment doctrines, especially if they rely on implied consent rationales to 
justify their new laws. As an initial matter, the Fourth Amendment requires law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of a private area.24 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable;25 however, this 
presumption can be overcome when an individual gives valid consent, either 
express or implied.26 
Theories of implied consent permeate two separate exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement: the general consent exception27 and the 
pervasively regulated industries exception, housed within the administrative 
search doctrine.28 The general consent doctrine of the Fourth Amendment is the 
most commonly used exception to the warrant requirement;29 it deems searches 
 
Rehnquistian narrowness is a red herring, because nothing in the writings of the Framers or of their 
contemporaries substantiates the implied consent doctrine . . . . Absent original intent and an original 
understanding of the Constitution, its protections are illusory. Implied consent finds no anchor in the Constitution 
as understood at the time of its ratification. Therefore, the doctrine is Fourth Amendment fakery. Considering 
judicial lawlessness, however, it is too much to expect that implied consent will be declared unconstitutional.” 
Stephen Kruger, Implied Consent Is Fourth Amendment Fakery, 45 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 45, 45–46 (1991).  
 22 Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), THALES, (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/biometric-data. 
 23 Brian Higgins, Congress, States Introduce New Laws for Facial Recognition, Face Data – Part 2, A.I. 
TECH. & L. (Apr. 12, 2019), http://aitechnologylaw.com/2019/04/congress-states-new-laws-facial-recognition-
face-date-part2/. 
 24 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357–58 (1967) (noting that “[s]earches conducted without 
warrants have been held unlawful” without an exception, including private areas such as a phonebooth). 
 25 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 8.2(l) (5th 
ed. 2019) (quoting State v. Banks, 434 P.3d 361, 371 (Or. 2019)). 
 26 See id. 
 27 Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent 
Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005). 
 28 The administrative search doctrine refers to searches that are usually done for regulatory, as opposed 
to criminal investigation, purposes. These include safety inspections, drug testing of employees, and school 
searches of children’s purses and are usually not conducted by police officers. JAMES TOMKOVICZ & WELSH 
WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 612 (8th ed. 
2017). 
 29 Simmons, supra note 27. 
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reasonable once an individual has consented to the search.30 Under this doctrine, 
consent can be given either explicitly or implicitly, as long as it meets the 
common law requirements.31 The pervasively32 regulated industries exception is 
continuing to develop, and courts are still determining the scope and reach of 
this exception’s application. It is premised on the notion that because business-
owners entering a pervasively regulated industry are on notice of the possibility 
of warrantless searches, the act of entering the industry serves as implied consent 
to particular searches and, therefore, these searches are reasonable absent a 
warrant.33  
This Comment draws on philosophical and legal approaches to implied 
consent to argue that notice alone is never sufficient to generate implied consent 
under the Fourth Amendment. Every formulation of consent used in law requires 
an affirmative, communicative act on the part of the consenter. Using notice 
alone to attempt to garner implied consent to search, thereby deeming a search 
reasonable, does not meet the requirements set forth in any Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. However, borrowing from the pervasively regulated industry 
exception, only if the government can show the presence of four elements should 
it be allowed to rely on implied consent effectuated from notice. 
Part I of this Comment evaluates the philosophical foundations of consent. 
It does so by looking at both the ontology of consent as well as the elements that 
comprise consent. Part II explores applications of implied consent within the 
legal realm. Specifically, it reviews applications of various implied consent-
based rationales in contract law, sexual assault law, and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on both the general 
consent exception and the pervasively regulated industries exception and 
analyzes the evolution of the implied consent doctrine in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence specifically. Part III focuses on the role of notice; it addresses the 
ambiguous role notice plays in consent theory. First, it provides an example of 
courts explicitly rejecting a notice-based implied consent approach in the private 
 
 30 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
 31 See LAFAVE, supra note 25; infra Part II. 
 32 Some scholars use the term “highly” or “closely” regulated industry instead. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking 
Closely Regulated Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 797, 797 (2016). 
 33 LAFAVE, supra note 25 (“The Supreme Court has said, for example, by way of justifying official 
inspections of the premises where certain types of business enterprises are carried on, that the ‘businessman in 
a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.’ This, so the analysis proceeds, is 
because when he ‘chooses to engage in [a] pervasively regulated business’ he ‘does so with the knowledge that 
his business . . . will be subject to effective inspection.’”) (alterations in original). See generally Rethinking 
Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32 (exploring the exception and arguing in favor of restricting it to 
protect customer privacy).  
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law setting (specifically clickwrap and browsewrap website agreements). 
Second, it evaluates the courts’ treatment of notice within the Fourth 
Amendment consent and pervasively regulated industries exceptions. Part IV 
combines philosophical and legal approaches to implied consent to show why 
notice alone should never be sufficient to generate the consent necessary to deem 
a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part V of this 
comment draws the line by arguing for a four-element approach to determine 
when notice can serve to generate implied consent for the purposes of a Fourth 
Amendment search.  
I. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONSENT: ONTOLOGY 
AND ELEMENTS 
This section explores the meaning of consent through a philosophical lens. 
Sections A and B seek to establish a basic, foundational definition of consent 
necessary to understand legal permutations of consent in different areas of law.  
A. Philosophical Ontology of Consent 
Any meaningful discussion of implied consent must begin with an 
understanding of the ontology34 of consent. In the broadest sense, consent theory 
is “any political, moral, legal, or social theory that casts society as a collection 
of free individuals and then seeks to explain or justify outcomes by appealing to 
their voluntary actions.”35 Consent philosophers often use the term “morally 
transformative consent,”36 which refers to consent that has made it “permissible 
for A to act with respect to B in a way that would be impermissible absent valid 
consent.”37 Morally transformative consent is a subset of consent that focuses 
on justifying actions between parties. There are three primary approaches to 
what constitutes morally transformative consent: psychological phenomenon, 
observable behavior, and the hybrid view.38  
 
 34 While the term “ontology” can refer to a few distinct aspects of a concept, for the purposes of this 
Comment it will refer to “problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which . . . exist.” 
Logic and Ontology, STAN. ENCY. PHIL. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/.  
 35 Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1668 (1990) (book 
review). 
 36 Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid 
Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 79, 79 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 
2010). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 84. 
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Consent as a psychological phenomenon means that “B consents if and only 
if she has the relevant mental state.”39 This definition tracks with scholar Heidi 
Hurd’s definition of consent as “an act of will—a subjective mental state akin to 
other morally and legally significant mens rea.”40 Scholar Peter Westen has 
described it as “a state of mind of acquiescence.”41 Ultimately, the psychological 
phenomenon approach to consent holds that the only necessary and sufficient 
element of valid consent is an individual’s mental state of consent. The 
communication of that mental state is an irrelevant inquiry when determining if 
one consented under this approach. In other words, regardless of external 
manifestations or actions, if one does not possess a mental state of consent to a 
particular course of action, she has not consented.  
The observable behavior model of consent states that “B consents if and only 
if she tokens or expresses consent in a conventionally appropriate way.”42 While 
we assume that people act according to their internal beliefs, this approach 
dictates that we ought not to inquire into the mental state of the consenter. 
Instead, we ought to focus on her behavior alone. In his piece, The Nature of 
Consent, John Kleinig defines consent through the logical equation “A 
consented (to B) to X,” where A and B are people and X is a course of action for 
which A’s authorization, permission, or agreement is required.43 Kleinig argues 
that consent is primarily (and most importantly) a communicative act that 
“serves to alter the moral relations in which A and B stand—and that for the 
moral relations to have been altered for B, a communicative act must have 
occurred.”44 Most of the time, one’s expression of consent usually reflects an 
internal mental state of consent. However, this theory becomes problematic in 
instances of miscommunication, where A may have thought she was consenting 
to one act, but due to a misunderstanding (in good or bad faith), she was 
perceived as consenting to a different act. In this example, A outwardly 
expressed consent, although her mental state was not aligned with that consent. 
According to this theory, only communication of consent is necessary and 
sufficient. Therefore, in the previous example, A’s expression of consent is 
sufficient to establish her morally transformative consent.  
 
 39 Id.  
 40 Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996). 
 41 Peter Westen, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A 
DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 5 (2004). 
 42 Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36, at 84. 
 43 John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 5–8 
(Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (variables altered). 
 44 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
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The mode of the expression, however, can be problematic when seeking to 
determine true mental consent. Take silence, for example. In a situation where 
silence is deemed to be consent,45 imagine an individual who is not paying 
attention and thus does not speak up when necessary; she will be deemed to have 
consented. Why? Because it is reasonable for others to act as if the person’s 
silence indicated consent.46 This example illustrates one problem inherent in the 
observable behavior model. Thus, for some scholars, the answer to such a 
problem lies in the hybrid approach: valid consent requires both a mental state 
of consent and the appropriate communicative expression of consent.47  
The variety of consent definitions already creates some serious issues, or at 
least questions, for the theory of implied consent; the differences between these 
definitions have important implications for implied consent. Under Kleinig’s 
theory, if consent rests exclusively on the mental state being communicated, 
implied consent is a particularly weak theory because valid consent requires 
some form of expression of consent, which arguably transforms it from implied 
to express consent. However, if consent is a subjective mental state, the theory 
of implied consent is more justifiable, since consent happens inside one’s mind 
and does not need to be communicated to be “real.” And yet, if consent permits 
others to act differently toward us, outward expressions perceived by those 
others arguably ought to be a necessary predicate.  
B. Philosophical Elements of Consent 
The ontology of consent is a different issue than the elements that comprise 
consent. John Kleinig’s approach in The Nature of Consent provides four 
necessary elements of consent: competence, voluntariness, knowledge, and 
intention.48 As Don Herzog explains, “Since consent theory explains moral 
obligations by specifying what the individual has voluntarily 
chosen . . . obstacles to voluntary choice, if inexorable, will compromise the 
usefulness of consent theory as a descriptive map and normative guide.”49 Two 
points emerge from this excerpt. First, consent is based on voluntary choice. 
Second, the meaning of consent is seriously compromised, even destroyed, when 
individuals lose, or never had, the ability to make a voluntary choice in the first 
place. One cannot justify an action through consent if a voluntary choice was 
never made. Voluntariness is the philosophical bedrock of consent.  
 
 45 For example, if someone says, “Speak now if you do not consent.” 
 46 Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36, at 85. 
 47 Id. at 84. 
 48 Kleinig, supra note 43, at 13–20. 
 49 Herzog, supra note 35, at 1674.  
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Implied consent works well to explain how an individual moves through the 
world on her own—we do not question the voluntariness of most of her daily 
actions; rather, we simply assume she is voluntarily acting and doing exactly as 
she pleases. However, implied consent becomes more complicated when we use 
it to explain interactions between two parties, especially two parties at arm’s 
length, like a citizen and a law enforcement agent. Without express consent, it 
can require a bit more work to ensure that an encounter was consensual. The use 
of this theory is further complicated when there is an unequal power dynamic 
between the two interacting parties, as exists between an individual and the state.  
Philosophy provides an important foundational understanding of consent 
and its elements. As consent theory, particularly implied consent, is 
operationalized in various areas of law, this foundational framework is tweaked 
and augmented in important ways.  
II. IMPLIED CONSENT IN VARIOUS AREAS OF LAW 
Theories of implied consent play a role in various fields of law, both civil 
and criminal. The fundamental framework in which we approach consent varies 
drastically between civil and criminal law.50 “[I]n the criminal law, ‘legal 
consent’ may be a mental state, whereas in torts or contracts ‘legal consent’ may 
be . . . performative.”51 In fact, criminal law, “at its boldest, almost pretends to 
judge a suspect’s thoughts.”52 In an effort to better understand the conceptual 
framework of implied consent, it is worth briefly analyzing how different areas 
of law, specifically contract, sexual assault law, and the Fourth Amendment, 
approach and justify this theory.  
A. Implied Consent in Contract Law  
The area of law that arguably leans most heavily on consent is contract law. 
The fundamental assumption of a contract, and the assumption most relevant to 
its validity, is that both parties consented, or agreed, to its terms.53 For centuries, 
contract law has used a theory of implied consent, referred to as “implied-in-
 
 50 Tom Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 17, 24 (2010) (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 042: Consent, LEGAL THEORY 
LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/11/legal_theory_le.html (last updated Jan. 19, 
2020)). 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id.  
 53 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (2020) (“The merit of these definitions is that they 
acknowledge that a contract establishes a relationship among the contracting parties that goes well beyond their 
express promises.”). 
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fact” and “implied-in-law,” to fill gaps where contracts lack express consent.54 
These gap-fillers are justified on principle and policy rather than on the true 
consent of the parties.55 In fact, gap-filling only takes place when parties have 
not expressly manifested agreement to the terms of a contract. “Implied-in-fact” 
refers to terms or creation of a contract that can be gleaned from a person’s 
behavior.56 Based on one party’s behavior, another party performs a service 
without being verbally asked to do so, and expects payment (or some other form 
of consideration).57 The prime example is the act of ordering food at a restaurant 
creating a contract for payment. No contract is signed, and no terms are 
discussed, but a contract has been created implicitly. 
Some scholars suggest that a more accurate conceptualization of implied 
consent in contract law is a “default” rules model, as opposed to an “implied” 
rules model when filling gaps in contracts.58 As scholar Randy Barnett argues, 
because contracts are grounded in the parties’ manifestation of their intent to be 
legally bound, they have actually consented, in the broadest sense, to a set of 
default rules. He analogizes default rules to the setting of a word processing 
program—while we do not explicitly set our margins and font each time we open 
a document, we consent to the settings, unless we manually override them.59 In 
certain contexts, rather than looking to justify ubiquitous contract terms via 
implied consent, it is more accurate to treat these terms as default rules that one 
must opt out of, as opposed to opt in to. The notion that these gap-fillers are so 
much a part of contract law as to be considered “default rules” demonstrates how 
inseparable the theory of implied consent is from contract law. 
B. Implied Consent in Sexual Assault Law 
Consent plays a notorious, oft critiqued, and particularly nebulous role in 
sexual relations and rape law. Superficially, one might say that the law 
criminalizes nonconsensual sex and allows consensual sex; but this is highly 
simplified and fails to account for the gradations within the meaning of consent. 
Over time, as feminist theory has developed, scholars have taken a closer, more 
 
 54 Willard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-Fact 
Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 606–09 (1991).  
 55 Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822 
(1992); Brian Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 261 (Franklin Miller & 
Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).  
 56 Bix, supra note 55. 
 57 Quasi Contract, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY (2012). 
 58 Barnett, supra note 55. 
 59 Id. at 824. 
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nuanced look at what consent to sex actually means. Coercion, competency, 
deception, and intoxication can complicate the consent inquiry.60  
Society has come a long way in its understanding of consent, particularly 
implied consent, within rape law. Common law theories of consent offered wide 
latitude to imply consent from behavior, largely based on the idea that women 
were either apathetic toward sex or embarrassed by their desires for sex; they 
therefore needed to be forced into the act to overcome these obstacles.61 Of 
course, women have also traditionally been viewed as an inferior population, 
their free will being both dominated and overridden by men.62 These misguided 
rationales led courts to find implied consent based on many “normal” female 
behaviors. Some judges were not looking for actual verbal consent, but rather 
behavior that signaled sexual availability.63  
The tides have certainly turned in this regard. The idea that sexually 
promiscuous behavior (or even normal behavior) somehow implies that one is 
consenting to sexual relations with whomever one encounters now seems 
ludicrous,64 and the law largely reflects such. Canada has gone so far as to 
explicitly hold that “[n]o defense of implied consent to sexual assault exists in 
Canadian law.”65  
 
 60 See Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 195, 204–17 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). 
 61 Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent 
Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (“A woman’s need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious 
desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might occur after 
willing participation.”); see also BYRON, DON JUAN, Canto I, stanza 117 (Marchand ed., 1958) (“A little still she 
strove, and much repented / And whispering, ‘I will ne’er consent,’—consented.”). 
 62 See, e.g., Muller v. State of Oregon 208 U.S. 412, 421–422 (1908) (“Still again, history discloses the 
fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. . . . [B]ut looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort 
to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality. . . . It is impossible to close one’s eyes 
to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him.”); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 
(1872) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”).  
 63 See State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1980) (overruling trial judge’s arrest of judgment where 
rape based upon a victim’s “friendly” behavior when judge stated that “if under those facts and circumstances a 
man has sexual intercourse with a woman, it seems to me, even if it can technically be said without her consent, 
I don’t think that we can, in any sense of the word, justify imposing a prison sentence upon him on that fact 
situation”). 
 64 See Lindsay Bever, The Persistent Myth That Revealing Clothing Leads to Rape, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 
2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/10/the-persistent-myth-
that-revealing-clothing-leads-to-rape/.  
 65 R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.). 
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Nonetheless, the theory of implied consent is still used today to justify the 
marital rape exemption.66 This exemption can be traced to ancient biblical 
ideology of women as property and marriage as a contract.67 “The husband 
cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their 
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this 
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”68 Because sexual intercourse 
within a marriage was assumed to be consensual and irrevocable,69 intramarital 
rape could not occur.70 While this understanding of implied consent is 
inconsistent with nearly every other conception of consent within criminal law,71 
the marital rape exemption persists in at least a dozen states.72 
It is difficult to comprehensively survey consent in sexual assault law 
because of the variety of statutes and approaches throughout the states. 
Culturally, there seems to be a movement toward stricter conceptions of consent, 
but criminal law has not necessarily tracked this evolution. While at least three 
states have affirmative consent laws,73 the definition of consent, and thus of 
implied consent, in sexual assault law is inconsistent. In some jurisdictions, a 
 
 66 But see SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS PROCESSES 435 (2017). Recent statutory reforms have substantially eroded this exception. Id. 
 67 See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE, 380 (1st ed. 1975). The 
exemption of husbands from rape prosecutions can be traced to our biblical forefathers’ interpretation of the 
definition of rape. Any carnal knowledge outside the marriage contract was deemed unlawful, while any carnal 
knowledge within the marriage contract was considered lawful. See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 
361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“This rule [for coverture laws] has worked out in reality to mean that though 
the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband.”).  
 68 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (photo. reprint 2003) (E. & R. 
Nutt & R. Gosling 1736) (spelling updated). 
 69 But see Theresa Fus, Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative 
Approaches, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 483 (“Variations on Hale’s strict irrevocability principle allow 
for a wife to revoke her implied sexual consent only in times when ‘ordinary relations’ in the marriage are 
suspended. For example, a woman can revoke her implied consent when she and her husband are separated.”). 
 70 Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in the Law of Marital Rape, 1989 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 343, 345–46 (1990) (“According to the theory of implied consent, marital rape is impossible 
because all sexual contact within a continuing relationship is presumed to be consensual. . . . Thus, under statutes 
grounded in the theory of implied consent, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is not a crime in the context of an 
ongoing sexual relationship.”).  
 71 See Lalenya Siegel, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 
354 (1995).  
 72 Briana Bierschbach, This Woman Fought to End Minnesota’s “Marital Rape” Exception, and Won, 
NPR (May 4, 2019, 7:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/04/719635969/this-woman-fought-to-end-
minnesotas-marital-rape-exception-and-won (“Roughly a dozen states shield a spouse from prosecution in a rape 
case, including South Carolina, where a married victim has to prove a threat of physical violence within 30 days 
of the rape. Ohio lawmakers are also debating removing a marital rape exception on their law books.”). 
 73 Jocelyn Noveck, In Defining Consent, There’s a Gap Between the Law, Culture, CLAIMS J. (May 21, 
2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2019/05/21/291029.htm. 
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lack of force suggests the victim did not resist and thus, consented.74 In the 
absence of affirmative consent, consent is implied through silence or lack of 
resistance—a clear example of consent being implied in the absence of 
affirmative consent. This conception of consent most closely reflects the 
“psychological phenomenon” approach.75 Although there is no communication 
of consent, behavior is used to assume a mental state of consent exists.  
C. Implied Consent under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides the people the right to be 
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”76 Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment.77 Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall under an 
exception to the warrant requirement.78 Rationales rooted in implied consent 
permeate both the general consent exception and the pervasively regulated 
industries exception.  
These exceptions have developed over time, but the role of implied consent 
remains ambiguous in application. Classic implied consent DUI laws, for 
example, are justified on a theory of, not surprisingly, implied consent. Although 
the precise laws differ from state to state, these statutes generally specify that a 
citizen, upon obtaining her driver’s license or driving on public roadways, has 
consented to a breathalyzer test (and sometimes a blood test) if pulled over by 
law enforcement and suspected of driving under the influence.79 These laws are 
discussed in more detail later.80 Before addressing the controversy around 
implied consent laws, it is necessary to first understand the court’s jurisprudence 
concerning its approach to the general consent exception.  
1. The General Consent Exception 
The Fourth Amendment generally requires that law enforcement officers 
 
 74 Patricia Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 44 (1997) (“Without proof 
of force, actual or constructive, evidenced by words or conduct of the defendant . . . , sexual intercourse is not 
rape. This is so even though the intercourse may have occurred without the actual consent and against the actual 
will of the alleged victim.” (quoting Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219–20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979))). 
 75 Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36. 
 76 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 77 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).  
 78 Id.  
 79 Implied Consent Laws, IMPLIEDCONSENT.ORG, http://www.impliedconsent.org/impliedconsentlaws. 
html (“When you signed forms to apply for a driver’s license, you agreed to comply with requests by law 
enforcement officers to take chemical testing to determine your blood-alcohol content (BAC).”). 
 80 See infra Part II.C.1.e. 
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obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of private property.81 However, 
because the Fourth Amendment only guarantees freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, searches deemed reasonable do not trigger the Fourth 
Amendment.82 One type of reasonable search is a consent-based search.83 In 
other words, once an officer obtains valid consent to search, the subsequent 
search is reasonable and thus in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. But 
ascertaining the meaning of valid consent is a complicated inquiry. 
Traditionally, courts analyze four factors to determine if officers obtained valid 
consent: indication, authority, voluntariness, and scope. While all of these 
factors are relevant to determining if an individual gave consent, the evaluation 
of each factor is slightly more complicated if a search is justified on implied, 
rather than express, consent.  
a. Indication 
The first factor, indication, is a key component differentiating consent from 
implied consent. Generally, courts are looking for any act communicating 
consent—an affirmative statement or a shrug could both qualify.84 Requiring 
indication of some sort fits with the philosophical conception of consent that 
requires a communicative act. Indication plays a key role in morally 
transformative consent according to the behavioral model;85 it is necessary to 
 
 81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  
 82 Id. at 361. 
 83 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well settled that one of the 
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is 
conducted pursuant to consent.”). 
 84 See, e.g., United States v. Faler, 832 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding “implied consent” where 
the officer asked, “mind if we come in?” and the apartment tenant “opened the door wider, moved out of the 
way, and then officers entered”); Wallace v. State, 62 A.3d 1192, 1195 (Del. 2012) (finding that the person who 
answered the door upon announcement of “probation and parole” had “opened the front door of the home wide 
enough to be considered an implied invitation to enter”); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 
2010) (finding that where the defendant, arrested on front porch, asked to be allowed to enter the house to put 
on more appropriate clothing, and officer said she could not enter unless he accompanied her, her subsequent 
entry constituted “implied consent” for officer to enter); Brown v. United States, 983 A.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. 
2009) (finding that although the defendant “did not give explicit, verbal permission, she nonetheless impliedly 
consented to the search by handing the bottle to” the officer “in response to a question about whether she had 
any ‘guns, drugs, or narcotics’”); Brown v. State, 856 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (using the 
concept of “implied consent” to conclude that a homeowner who calls the police to a murder scene and asserts 
a crime was committed by a third party may be deemed to have allowed the police to enter for purposes of “a 
search of the premises reasonably related to the routine investigation of the offense”). The concurring opinion 
in Brown v. State helpfully notes that in lieu of the fiction of implied consent, it would be better to say that what 
is needed is “the actual consent of the owner, express or implied.” 856 S.W.2d at 184 (McCormick, J., 
concurring).  
 85 Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36.  
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satisfy half of the equation in the hybrid model, which conditions valid consent 
on both the indication of consent and the mental state of consent. 
In the context of implied consent, indication is almost always given in the 
form of an act. Words and assertive behavior (such as a nod or gesture) serve as 
express indication, whereas taking an action (like parking one’s car, obtaining a 
driver’s license, or walking on public streets) can only serve as implied 
indication in certain situations. For example, to return briefly to Bristol’s street 
signs, if challenged in court, the government would likely argue that in light of 
the posted signs, the act of parking one’s car is the indication of consent. 
Although no words are exchanged or affirmative acknowledgements given, the 
act alone is enough to indicate consent.  
However, there are serious concerns with this approach to indication of 
implied consent.86 The primary concern is illustrated by the individual who fails 
to notice the posted sign. Tying indication of consent to an action assumes that 
the individual is aware of the consent associated with her action in a particular 
scenario. The government is resting on the assumption that an individual sees 
the parking sign on the Bristol streets; or, in the case of the Denver monitoring 
signs, assumes the individual notices the sign making her aware of the data 
collection. In the case of DUI implied consent laws, the government is assuming 
an individual is aware of the statute. The fallacy of this approach lies in these 
incorrect assumptions—absent actual awareness of the notice, one’s behavior 
does not indicate consent.  
b. Authority  
The second factor, authority, requires that valid consent be obtained either 
from someone who had the actual authority to consent to the search,87 or who 
the police reasonably believed had the authority to consent.88 Consent can be 
 
 86 See LAFAVE, supra note 25, at § 8.2(g) (“While . . . cooperative action in connection with the search 
itself may be a factor appropriately cited by a court to add strength to the conclusion that a particular consent 
was voluntary when no highly coercive elements are present, or even when the issue is what interpretation is to 
be given to an ambiguous or equivocal response to a police request for consent, there will be other situations in 
which it is not a useful indicator of consent.”).  
 87 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–70 (1974) (noting that the police can obtain consent for a 
search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises). 
 88 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that a warrantless search does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the 
authority to do so). There is a major implication of the shift from relinquishment theory to reasonable search 
theory. A search justified on apparent authority, as established in Rodriguez, does not rest on the target’s 
relinquishment of her expectation of privacy. In fact, by definition, the target has not relinquished any privacy 
expectation. Rather, the justification is that if the police acted reasonably in believing that the consenter had the 
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obtained “either from the individual whose property is searched . . . or from a 
third party who possesses common authority over the premises.”89 Common 
authority rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 
access or control for most purposes.”90 The Court has justified this approach on 
an assumption of the risk theory. In other words, when we expose and share our 
space with someone else, we assume the risk that they will allow others, 
including police officers, into our shared space, thereby exposing it to the public. 
With the explosion of social networking and apps gathering users’ personal 
information, authority as it pertains to the third-party doctrine is a hot topic 
amongst Fourth Amendment scholars.  
The controversy stems from a fundamental change in how, where, and with 
whom people share their personal data.91 Social networking websites and apps 
like Facebook and TikTok gather and store users’ data. This website or app now 
owns the data and can consent to its release. The massive expansion in the use 
of these apps, combined with the highly personal data being shared, raises 
questions about the efficacy of the third-party search doctrine92 in our highly 
integrated world. Regardless of who can authorize consent, that consent must be 
given voluntarily. 
c. Voluntariness 
The third factor, voluntariness, requires that valid consent be obtained 
voluntarily. The seminal case analyzing voluntariness is Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte.93 In Bustamonte, officers obtained consent to search a vehicle, 
which contained stolen checks.94 The officers asked the occupants if they could 
search the glove compartment, to which one of the occupants responded, “Sure, 
go ahead.”95 The state filed charges after the search uncovered stolen checks in 
the defendant’s glove compartment.96 The defendant moved to suppress the 
 
authority to consent to the search (although she did not, in fact, have such authority), there is no behavior to 
deter and therefore no reason to suppress the evidence gathered during the search.  
 89 Id. at 181.  
 90 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.  
 91 See Lisa Schmidt, Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking on Facebook, 
Twitter and Foursquare, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 524 (2012).  
 92 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (officially adopting the third-party 
search doctrine, stating “this Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”). For a more recent and robust discussion of this 
doctrine, see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 93 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 94 Id. at 220.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
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checks, arguing that the consent was not valid because he was not notified of his 
right to refuse to consent to the search.97 The issue before the Supreme Court 
was whether consent is voluntary if given without the police notifying the 
consenter of her right to refuse.98  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the state need 
not prove that the consenter knew she had the right to refuse in order for consent 
to be deemed voluntary.99 It instead relied on the “traditional” definition of 
consent,100 which does not require proof of knowledge that one can refuse to 
consent. Voluntariness, in the Court’s eyes, can only be determined by looking 
at the “totality of the circumstances”101:  
While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken 
into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the 
sine qua non of an effective consent. As with police questioning, two 
competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the 
meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such 
searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the 
absence of coercion.102 
Bustamonte holds that voluntariness of consent requires individual inquiries into 
the particular set of circumstances surrounding consent.103 The court should look 
to both characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.104  
The 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States clarified what it means to act 
voluntarily in a world inundated with technology.105 Although in the context of 
the third-party doctrine, the Court in Carpenter rejected the notion that using a 
 
 97 Id. at 219. 
 98 Id. at 222.  
 99 Id. at 248–49.  
 100 Id. at 225–26 (“The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-
American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially 
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it 
is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his 
confession offends due process.”). 
 101 Id. at 227.  
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 226. Characteristics of the accused include age, education, intelligence, level of intoxication, 
cognitive deficits, experience with the justice system, and knowledge of the right to refuse. Id. Characteristics 
of the encounter include the number of officers present, their attitude toward the target, the issuance of threats, 
the presence of weapons, whether they advised target of her right to leave, time of detention, and whether they 
falsely claimed they had a warrant. Id. 
 105 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
TOMKOVICZPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:09 PM 
172 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:153 
cell phone and thereby subjecting oneself to constant tracking106 is truly 
voluntary for two reasons:  
In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is 
indispensable to participation in modern society. Second, a cell phone 
logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative 
act on the part of the user beyond powering up.107 
Because cell phones are so necessary to modern life and because the generation 
of location information is not based on any affirmative action of the cell phone 
owner,108 the data is not generated “voluntarily” in any meaningful sense. 
d. Scope 
The last factor in the analysis concerns the scope of the search. The consenter 
has control over the scope of the search to which she consents, and a consent-
based search is only valid if it does not exceed the scope to which the consenter 
agreed. However, the Court has again relied on a reasonableness standard when 
questions of scope arise. In Florida v. Jimeno, an officer pulled over Enio 
Jimeno and informed him that he believed there were drugs in Jimeno’s 
vehicle.109 Jimeno consented to a search of his vehicle, which turned up a small 
paper bag which contained cocaine.110 At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent 
did not extend to the bag found within his car.111 The Supreme Court disagreed 
and held that the Fourth Amendment is “satisfied when, under the 
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the 
scope of the suspect’s consent permitted him to open a particular container”112 
within the automobile. The Court relied heavily on the fact that the officer had 
informed the consenter of his intent to search for drugs. “We think it was 
objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to 
 
 106 Cell phones continuously track location by sending signals to the nearest cell phone tower at various 
times. Id. at 2210. Signals are sent whenever a user uses her phone, but also when a call or text is received, and 
at random by the cell phone company. Id. The precision of the user’s GPS location depends on the density of 
the towers in a given city. This historical data can be gathered and essentially creates a map of the user’s 
movement, wherever he she goes. Id. 
 107 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 108 This important rationale distinguishes Carpenter from Smith v. Maryland. 442 U. S. 735, 744 (1979). 
In Smith, because information was only gathered when the defendant placed a call, he “voluntarily conveyed” 
the dialed numbers to the phone company by “expos[ing] that information to its equipment in the ordinary course 
of business.” Id. 
 109 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991). 
 110 Id. at 249–50. 
 111 Id. at 250.  
 112 Id. at 248. 
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search respondent’s car included consent to search containers within that car 
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that 
narcotics are generally carried in . . . a container.”113 
The scope of consent was addressed again twenty-two years after Jimeno in 
Florida v. Jardines,114 which specifically looked at the scope of an implied 
license. In this case, two officers and a trained police dog approached the 
defendant’s front door, without a warrant, on a tip regarding marijuana growth 
inside the home.115 After sniffing around the defendant’s front porch, the dog 
detected an odor, and based on this information, the detectives received a 
warrant to search the home.116 At trial, the judge suppressed the evidence on the 
grounds that the canine search was an unreasonable search.117 The Supreme 
Court granted cert on the question of “whether the officers’ behavior was a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”118 
The Court held that the officers’ behavior was an unconstitutional search 
under the Fourth Amendment.119 In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
analyzed whether the defendant “had given his leave (even implicitly)” for them 
to approach.120 The answer turns on the implied social license, which stems from 
a theory of implied consent.121 As the Court explained, there are certain signs—
for example, a knocker on a door—that invite specific actions from the public.122 
In these situations, explicit consent to engage in the invited behavior is not 
necessary because these practices are so woven into society that we assume 
everyone is aware of their meaning. However, implied licenses are still limited: 
“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular 
area but also to a specific purpose.”123 Because Jardines involved the approach 
to a house for criminal investigation purposes, the Court found the officers acted 
outside the bounds of the implied social license, and thus, there was no consent, 
and the search was unconstitutional.  
 
 113 Id. at 251.  
 114 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 115 Id. at 3–4.  
 116 Id. at 4.  
 117 Id. at 4–5.  
 118 Id. at 3. 
 119 Id. at 11–12. 
 120 Id. at 8. 
 
121
 Id. (“A license may be implied from the habits of the country.” (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 
127, 135 (1922))). 
 122 Id. (“This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock 
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the 
terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge.”). 
 123 Id. at 9. 
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Implied licenses raise important questions about the revocability of the 
implied consent to engage in the invited behavior. Based on the Jardines Court’s 
justification for the implied license, an individual who does not wish to grant a 
license could presumably revoke it.124 However, courts are split on the extent to 
which citizens must make clear their efforts to revoke implied licenses. There is 
contradictory authority as to the validity and efficacy of the most common means 
of keeping people off one’s property: the “No Trespassing” sign.125 Because 
consent is only valid as to the scope set by the consenter, it must be revoked to 
be valid. This fact has important implications when analyzing the role of notice, 
since a sign conferring consent often offers no possibility of revocation. 
Additionally, the implied license rests on the assumption that everyone is invited 
to perform the specific act that the implied license permits. That is to say, there 
could not be an implied license that extends to or limits only law enforcement 
officers.  
e. Implied Consent Laws in the DUI Context 
Traditional implied consent laws rest on shaky Fourth Amendment footing. 
Courts have struggled with the constitutionality of implied consent statutes 
seeking to ensure public safety by curtailing drunk driving. These laws differ 
from state to state, but most condition the receipt of a driver’s license on an 
individual’s preemptive consent to a breath and blood test when pulled over on 
suspicion of driving while intoxicated.126 The state statute serves to provide 
 
 124 For example, a “No Trespassing” sign could function as notice to the public that this specific person 
has revoked the otherwise implied license to approach one’s house for certain purposes. 
 125 See United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 996 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that multiple “No 
Trespassing” signs including a sign stating “Posted Private Property Hunting, Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing 
for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be Prosecuted” was not an unambiguous and clear 
revocation of the implied license to approach and thus, an objective officer would not have understood that the 
implied license he would ordinarily have to approach the porch and knock on the front door of a home had been 
revoked at this house); United States v. Jones, No. 4:13cr00011–003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *5 (W.D. Va. Aug. 
30, 2013) (holding, post-Jardines, that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering rural property, 
driving past “No Trespassing” signs on either side of the driveway, passing another sign on their way to the 
house and another affixed to the house, and walking past a “No Trespassing” sign hanging to the right of the 
front door in order to conduct a knock-and-talk). But see United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1270 
(M.D. Fla. 2015) (“However, it may be inferred from these cases that the combination of posting a ‘No 
Trespassing’ sign along with the physical act of closing the gate does serve to seal the property and manifest the 
resident’s intent to revoke the implied license to enter.”). See generally, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Stephen 
E. Henderson, LAWn Signs: A Fourth Amendment for Constitutional Curmudgeons, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 487 
(2016).  
 126 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016) (“They provided that cooperation with BAC 
testing was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads and that the privilege would be rescinded if a 
suspected drunk driver refused to honor that condition.”). 
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notice of an individual’s consent.127 Essentially, drivers must “consent” to a 
potential future breath and blood test at the time they receive their license.128 As 
the court’s consent doctrine dictates, valid consent must be indicated by 
someone with actual or apparent authority, and voluntarily given, based on a 
totality of the circumstances. It is dishonest to suggest that an application of the 
classic consent doctrine would render these “consents” valid. It cannot be said 
that every person with a driver’s license has truly consented to an unknown 
search potentially years or decades before it happens.129 Instead, legislatures 
have justified these laws under the theory of implied consent.  
The Supreme Court’s DUI implied consent law jurisprudence suggests an 
unwillingness to engage with these laws on consent exception grounds. In the 
three most recent Supreme Court cases implicating these laws with respect to 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court has chosen to justify warrantless roadside 
breath and blood tests using either the exigent circumstances doctrine or the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.130 This may be because, despite their name, 
implied consent laws are theoretically and analytically distinct from the notion 
of consent, so much so that it may strain credulity to suggest that these laws 
create any meaningful consent at all.  
Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently 
asserted their skepticism of implied consent laws in Mitchell v. Wisconsin.131 In 
her dissent, Justice Sotomayor rejected the consent rationale that was argued by 
the state but rejected by the plurality: “The plurality does not rely on the consent 
exception here. With that sliver of the plurality’s reasoning I agree. I would go 
further and hold that the state statute, however phrased, cannot itself create the 
actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”132 During 
 
 127 Implied Consent Laws, supra note 79. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Douglas Husak refers to this concept as “hypothetical consent” and argues that it is impossible to give 
consent non-contemporaneously with the act to which you are consenting. Douglas Husak, Paternalism and 
Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 107, 113–15 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer 
eds., 2010). 
 130 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (holding that a breath test, but not blood test, can be administered as 
a search incident to arrest for drunk driving); Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2539 (2019) (holding that 
in almost all situations, when the police have probable cause to believe a person had committed a drunk-driving 
offense and the driver’s unconsciousness required him to be taken to the hospital before the police had a 
reasonable opportunity to administer a breath test, they can order a warrantless blood test); Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (holding that a warrantless roadside blood test is not categorically constitutional, but 
the exigency justification must be determined on a case by case basis). 
 131 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541.  
 132 Id. at 2545. 
TOMKOVICZPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:09 PM 
176 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:153 
oral arguments for this case, Justice Ginsburg also rejected the idea that implied 
consent is based on real consent:  
But it’s a fiction, isn’t it? It’s not consent, no matter how much you 
call it implied or presumed. And it’s typical of the original non-
resident motor vehicle statutes. They said, if you drive on our roads, 
then you will be deemed to have consented to appoint a secretary of 
state as your agent, and in time, we came to appreciate that that is not 
genuine.133  
The majority did not address the theoretical underpinnings of implied consent 
laws, but its unwillingness to answer the question on which they granted cert134 
suggests discomfort with the notion, or inability to justify, that implied consent 
laws are based on a meaningful definition of consent.  
2. The Administrative Search Doctrine and Pervasively Regulated 
Industries Exceptions 
Although less obvious, the theory of implied consent is foundational to 
another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement—the closely 
regulated industry exception under the administrative search exception.135 This 
prong of Fourth Amendment analysis has largely escaped scrutiny. The 
administrative search doctrine, first formulated a half-century ago, justifies 
broad searches for safety purposes of schools, businesses, government 
employees, and more.136 This doctrine is justified on the government’s need to 
ensure compliance with laws and regulations through inspection,137 and it allows 
warrants to be issued based not on probable cause, but lower legislative or 
regulatory standards.138  
The pervasively regulated industries exception is an exception to the 
administrative search doctrine. This exception allows law enforcement to 
inspect businesses in certain industries, under certain conditions, absent a 
 
 133 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).  
 134 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2542–43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether a statute like Wisconsin’s, which allows police to draw blood from an unconscious drunk-driving 
suspect, provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”). 
 135 See Eve Brensike Primus, Bringing Clarity to Administrative Search Doctrine: Distinguishing 
Dragnets from Special Subpopulation Searches, 39 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 61 (2012). 
 136 G. S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2018).  
 137 Id. (“The administrative search exception permits government officials, to perform this duty without 
having to seek warrants for every inspection of business records or premises, increasing efficiency and allowing 
the government to promote regulatory compliance, consumer protection, and public safety.”).  
 138 Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538–39 (1967). 
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warrant.139 Courts have accepted Congress’s broad power to design inspection 
schemes deemed necessary to ensure safety of certain industries.140 This 
exception warrants analysis when looking at justifications of theories of implied 
consent because it turns on the notion that business-owners entering pervasively 
regulated industries are aware of the regulations in place, and thus implicitly 
consent to warrantless inspections simply by entering the industry.141 This 
doctrine also assumes that searching a commercial property results in a lesser 
intrusion of privacy than searching a home, and that the government has a strong 
interest in conducting the search, usually on public safety grounds.142  
The historical evolution of this doctrine illustrates why the Court has carved 
out this exception to the warrant requirement. The 1972 case of United States v. 
Biswell143 established the doctrine and crafted its first iteration. The Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a statute authorizing law enforcement to enter and 
search businesses in the firearms industry.144 The Biswell Court held that where 
“regulatory inspections further urgent federal interests, and the possibility of 
abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection 
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute.”145 
While Biswell created this exception, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.146 and 
Donovan v. Dewey147 set its scope. In Barlow’s, the Supreme Court held that the 
warrantless inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSH Act) at issue in this case were unconstitutional.148 These provisions 
allowed warrantless searches of any employment facility under Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) jurisdiction.149 The Court found the 
OSH Act provision far too broad to fit within the rationales on which this 
exception rests. Specifically, the Court pointed to a notice and implied-consent 
 
 139 Rethinking Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32. 
 140 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).  
 141 Rethinking Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32, at 803. 
 142 Id. at 797–98.  
 143 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
 144 Id. at 317. 
 145 Id. Notably, the Court explicitly distinguished between the exception it was creating and the consent 
exception: “In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, 
place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” Id. at 
315.  
 146 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
 147 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).  
 148 Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 307. 
 149 Id. at 309. (“Section 8 (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 . . . empowers agents of 
the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act’s 
jurisdiction.”).  
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rationale to justify this exception in only a limited subset of industries: “when 
an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to 
subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.”150 The Barlow’s 
Court required a history of distinctive regulation in a particular industry for this 
exception to apply: the history of regulation provides the necessary notice.  
Essentially, the Court reiterated that notice is a key element of this exception: 
business-owners are aware that entering a certain industry will subject them to 
warrantless inspections.151 Where an inspection scheme is too broad and 
unparticular, business-owners cannot truly be on notice that they will be subject 
to its terms.152 Therefore, the act of entering any industry cannot really serve as 
“consent.”153 But just three years later, in Donovan v. Dewey, the Court 
weakened this rationale.154 While the Court did not eliminate history of 
regulation as a factor, the Court transformed it from a requirement to a non-
dispositive factor. Warrantless searches could still be upheld under this 
exception, but only if Congress’s inspection regime “establishes a predictable 
and guided federal regulatory presence.”155 In other words, after Dewey, 
predictability was the key inquiry, and a history of industry regulation that put 
business-owners on notice of potential warrantless searches was one way to 
show the inspection was predictable.156 History of regulation was no longer 
required to justify a search under the pervasively regulated industry exception; 
it was simply part of the analysis.157  
Fifteen years later, in New York v. Burger,158 the Court expounded the 
requirements that must be met in order for a search to qualify as reasonable, and 
thus fall within this exception.159 It articulated three factors.160 First, the search 
regime must advance a substantial government interest.161 Second, the search 
must be a necessary component of the regulatory scheme.162 Third, the 
 
 150 Id. at 313; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (“[B]usinessmen 
engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their 
trade . . . [and] in effect consent[] to the restrictions placed upon [them].”). 
 151 Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313. 
 152 See id.  
 153 Id. at 313–14. 
 154 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 605–06 (1981).  
 155 Id. at 603–04. 
 156 Id. at 606. 
 157 Id. at 605–06.  
 158 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).  
 159 Id. at 691–92. 
 160 Id. at 702. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Id. 
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inspection program must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant by providing notice to the owner and must limit police discretion.163 The 
Burger Court believed notice played an important role in determining whether a 
warrantless search is reasonable, even when a statutory scheme allowing such 
inspection is in place.  
Burger was part of a series of cases that led to the expansion of the 
pervasively regulated industries exception. Not until the 2015 case of City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel164 did the Court contract the application of this exception. The 
Patel Court struck down a city ordinance allowing law enforcement officers to 
inspect a hotel’s guest registry without a warrant.165 The Court held that the 
regulation scheme for hotels was not comprehensive enough to qualify under 
this exception and was instead more of a general regulation scheme, like a set of 
minimum wage laws.166 Again, the Court reiterated the importance of notice—
the regulation scheme must be comprehensive enough to put business-owners 
on notice of possible warrantless inspections.167 Notice is important because it 
curtails a business-owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
documentation and operation of the business.  
Though the pervasively regulated industries exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement is still evolving, the Court has consistently 
stressed the importance that both notice and governmental interest, particularly 
public safety, play in justifying this exception. The fact that business-owners 
entering a particular industry are aware of regulation and inspection schemes 
already in place, combined with the important public safety goals that often 
underlie these regulation schemes, reduces any claims business-owners have to 
an expectation of privacy. This reduction in privacy has led the Court to justify 
a warrant exception rooted in a theory of implied consent. In other words, the 
reduction in privacy interest is so great in these settings as to be the functional 
equivalent of consent. The pervasively regulated industries exception provides 
a helpful guidepost for courts evaluating the appropriate relationship between 
consent and notice. This Comment now turns to a more comprehensive look at 
the role notice plays in consent theory throughout various areas of law.  
 
 163 Id. at 703.  
 164 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). 
 165 Id. at 2447. 
 166 Id. at 2455. Barlow’s had already rejected the idea that minimum wage and maximum work hour laws 
were enough to qualify a business or industry as “highly regulated.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 
314 (1978). 
 167 Id.  
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III. THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF NOTICE IN CONSENT THEORY 
Nearly all conceptualizations of consent in the legal realm require or assume 
that an individual is aware of two things: the fact that she is consenting, and the 
things to which she is consenting.168 Because these factors are foundational, any 
meaningful theory of implied consent should at the very least require that some 
form of notice be given before consent can potentially be implied. It is certainly 
necessary, but is it sufficient? It is helpful to analyze the treatment of notice with 
respect to consent across various areas of law.  
A. Notice in the Private Law Setting: Clickwrap Versus Browsewrap 
The explosion of the internet’s role in daily transactions has forced courts to 
determine what qualifies as adequate notice to users of a website’s terms and 
conditions. There are traditionally two approaches websites use: clickwrap and 
browsewrap.169 Clickwrap agreements require a user to click an “I agree” (to the 
terms and conditions of the website) button before they can use or browse a 
website.170 These agreements have generally received favorable treatment from 
courts,171 likely because this approach makes it practically impossible to proceed 
using a site without being notified and explicitly consenting to the terms.  
Browsewrap agreements also serve to inform users of the terms and 
conditions of a website, but these agreements are simply presented to the user 
on the page and do not require the user to affirmatively consent to the terms 
before using the site.172 “A party instead gives his assent simply by using the 
website.”173 Courts have not been as impressed with these types of 
agreements.174 The validity of browsewrap agreements “turns on whether a 
 
 168 Of course, the purely psychological approach does not require these elements, but that theory does not 
appear in the legal context. See Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36.  
 169 1 LAW OF THE INTERNET (MB) ch. 1, § 1.03 (2019).  
 170 Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and 
the Reasonably Communicated Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 482 (2002) (“Clickwrap agreements typically 
consist of a window containing the terms of the agreement that ‘pops up’ on the computer screen when a user 
tries to download or install software. The user has to click on a button labeled ‘I AGREE’ or ‘I ACCEPT’ to 
continue.”).  
 171 1 LAW OF THE INTERNET, supra note 169. 
 172 Das, supra note 170, at 482 (“Browsewrap agreements appear in the form of a hyperlink on the 
vendor’s website. Unlike clickwrap agreements, the terms of a browsewrap agreement are not displayed on the 
computer screen unless the user clicks on the hyperlink.”). 
 173 Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *4 (N.D. 
Tex. Sep. 12, 2007). 
 174 See Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *7–
8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (holding that Tickets.com could not be held to terms on a website because “[i]t 
cannot be said that merely putting the terms and conditions in this [browsewrap] fashion necessarily creates a 
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website user has actual or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and 
conditions prior to using the site.”175 The courts’ treatments of clickwrap versus 
browsewrap agreements show a clear preference for affirmative consent as 
opposed to simply assuming users are aware of terms that are posted on a site.  
B. The Role of Notice in Fourth Amendment Searches 
Notice plays a role, albeit an ambiguous one, in the Fourth Amendment 
consent doctrine as well. Courts are skeptical of the claim that notice alone can 
be sufficient to establish valid implied consent to search. As the court states in 
McGann v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp.,176 “there is a 
view that the doctrine of implied consent really has little to do with consent as 
that term is generally understood, but is in reality a separate exception to the 
warrant requirement comparable to the exception for regulatory searches 
undertaken for an administrative purpose.”177 McGann,178 a case out of the 
Seventh Circuit, addressed the role of notice in the Fourth Amendment consent 
search doctrine head on.  
McGann involved the search of vehicles parked in a lot displaying a sign 
giving notice of potential vehicle searches.179 Plaintiffs, employees of Metra 
Rail, parked their cars at Metra’s lot prior to work.180 The lot was fully enclosed 
by a fence and had two entrances.181 At each entrance, there was a prominent 
sign that read, “VEHICLES ENTERING OR EXITING METRA PROPERTY 
ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH BY METRA POLICE.”182 The plaintiffs were 
stopped by Metra police officers while leaving the lot, asked to exit their 
vehicles, and told by the officers that they had already “submitted to that.”183 
There were disputed facts as to the parties’ actual consent when Metra attempted 
 
contract with anyone using the web site”); see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (holding a browsewrap contract invalid and unenforceable because “a reasonably prudent Internet 
user in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the existence of the license terms . . . . In 
consequence, plaintiffs’ bare act of downloading the software did not unambiguously manifest assent”). But see 
Handy v. LogMeIn, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01355-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97021, at *22–23 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 
2015) (holding a browsewrap notice provided notice to prospective purchasers of terms of purchase). 
 175 Southwest Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5.  
 176 McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 8 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 177 Id. at 1181 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 178 Id. at 1174.  
 179 Id. at 1176.  
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 1177.  
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to search their vehicles.184 Metra moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
plaintiffs consented to the search by entering the lot with knowledge of the 
posted sign.185 The district court granted summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs, but did not directly address the validity of the consent based upon the 
signage alone.186  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit took up the plaintiff’s argument that the sign 
alone was not enough to effectuate the implied consent necessary to conduct the 
search.187 In response, Metra directed the court to other cases where courts have 
found implied consent where a person “voluntarily undert[ook] conduct which 
the person was aware could subject him to a search.”188 The examples Metra 
provided were all searches at security checkpoints, which are reasonable 
searches pursuant to the administrative search doctrine, not the general consent 
exception.189 Metra argued that knowledge of the sign giving notice of potential 
search and voluntary conduct subjecting the person to a search were the sole 
requirements for a court to imply consent.190  
The Seventh Circuit rejected Metra’s argument for two primary reasons: 
(1) the protection of the important interests of the Fourth Amendment generally, 
and (2) the lack of support for Metra’s argument in either the consent doctrine 
or case law. Recognizing its position as a fierce defender of the constitutional 
protections granted by the Fourth Amendment,191 the court reiterated its duty to 
“guard[] jealously against tactics taken to obtain a person’s consent, and to be 
especially wary of those which may appear least objectionable.”192 The court 
was particularly concerned about schemes conditioning access to a facility or 
service on the waiver of a constitutional right, noting that these schemes 
diminish the voluntariness aspect necessary for valid consent.193 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 1176, 1179, 1187–88. 
 187 Id. at 1181. 
 188 Id. at 1179. 
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 1180. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id.; cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) 
(“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition 
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. 
It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly over the 
view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt.”); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent 
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the 
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In addition to the broader constitutional objections to notice-only implied 
consent, the court noted that courts faced with similar issues have looked at a 
number of factors, not just notice and voluntary action:  
(1) the person searched was on notice that undertaking certain conduct, 
like attempting to enter a building or board an airplane, would subject 
him to a search, (2) the person voluntarily engaged in the specified 
conduct, (3) the search was justified by a vital interest, (4) the search 
was reasonably effective in securing the interests at stake, (5) the 
search was only as intrusive as necessary to further the interests 
justifying the search and (6) the search curtailed, to some extent, 
unbridled discretion in the searching officers.194 
Essentially, the court is requiring a balancing approach in order to find implied 
consent under the Fourth Amendment. Interestingly, while this search is not 
discussed in the context of the administrative search doctrine, the factors listed 
by the court reflect considerations more akin to those of the pervasively 
regulated industries exception. In any case, the court explicitly states that these 
factors are not dispositive and should be weighed in each case.195 The McGann 
court reversed summary judgment, finding that whether the sign and the 
voluntary act were enough to imply consent of the plaintiffs presented a question 
of fact for the jury.196  
McGann is a prototypical example of a court rejecting the argument that 
providing notice, by itself, is sufficient to provide consent under the Fourth 
Amendment. However, other circuits have addressed the issue of notice and 
consent differently, holding that notice alone did provide the government the 
implied consent it needed to search. United States v. Woodrum197 involved the 
Boston Police Department’s program, Taxi Inspection Program for Safety 
(TIPS), which was designed to increase cab driver safety in the city.198 It allowed 
officers to randomly pull over participating taxis to check on their safety.199 This 
program provided window decals to taxis of drivers who voluntarily chose to 
participate in the program.200 The decals read, in all capital letters, “Public 
 
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close 
and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if 
it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights 
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”).  
 194 McGann, 8 F.3d at 1181. 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id. at 1186–87. 
 197 United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 198 Id. at 3–4. 
 199 Id. at 4. 
 200 Id. 
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Notice: Boston Police Taxi Inspection Program for Safety,” and “This vehicle 
may be stopped and visually inspected by the Boston Police at any time to ensure 
driver’s safety.”201 The First Circuit held that notice provided by a decal on a 
taxicab was sufficient to obtain consent from passengers riding in the cab.202 
Interestingly, the court in Woodrum did not use a similar, factors-based totality 
of the circumstances approach used in McGann.  
When evaluating the validity of the consent, the court analyzed it vis-à-vis 
the owner of the cab, the driver of the cab, and the passengers of the cab. 
Although this case involved a seizure as opposed to a search,203 the court relied 
on case law dealing with searches because the rationale is similar. The court 
reasoned that there was valid consent vis-à-vis the owner because he “freely 
chose to register for the program of taxi safety stops, and the TIPS decals furnish 
tangible proof of this consent. Although the consent was anticipatory and 
unparticularized, it was direct.”204 Here, the owner’s voluntary enrollment, along 
with the decal on the car providing notice, were enough to effectuate consent to 
search the vehicle vis-à-vis the owner of the cab.  
The court’s reasoning in finding consent as to the driver, however, is 
particularly interesting. Finding that because the owner acted on behalf of both 
himself and his employee drivers when signing up for the TIPS program, the 
seizure was reasonable.205 To justify this rationale, the court cites Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc.,206 the case rejecting the reasonableness of a warrantless search 
under the pervasively regulated industries exception.207 Additionally, the court 
noted that the decals provided adequate notice to both the driver and the 
passengers that the cab was enrolled in the TIPS program, and thus have 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 11–12. On the night of January 22, 1998, the defendants were passengers in a TIPS cab. The cab 
was pulled over, and without a warrant, the passengers were asked to exit the vehicle. Id. at 4. In the course of 
exiting the vehicle, a gun fell from one of the passenger’s coats, and a search of the vehicle turned up crack 
cocaine, a pipe, a pager, and cash. Id. at 5. The defendant passengers were ultimately charged with felony 
possession of a firearm and ammunition and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. The defendants 
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, but the district court upheld the stop on a couple 
grounds, notably, that the TIPS decal provided the consent necessary for the stop and seizure. Id. The defendants 
proffered a three-fold argument. First, there was insufficient evidence to establish either the taxi owner’s or taxi 
driver’s consent. Id. at 8. Second, the TIPS program is unconstitutional because it conditioned employment on 
a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights and does not limit the discretion of the officers making the stops. Id. at 
10. Third, even if the TIPS consent legitimizes some stops, the scope of the program does not include this 
particular stop because it was not motivated by driver safety. Id. at 8. 
 203 Id.  
 204 Id. at 9.  
 205 Id. at 9–10.  
 206 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978). 
 207 Id.  
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submitted to being stopped and searched.208 In this case, the decal on the taxi 
window served as sufficient notice for the court to find implied consent to the 
subsequent search by the police.  
Another major example of notice playing a fundamental role in garnering 
implied consent is one with which many citizens are familiar—the 
Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) airport security checkpoint 
search.209 Notably, the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that airport 
searches are constitutional,210 but it has implied their constitutionality in dicta.211 
These searches are justified under the administrative search doctrine,212 which 
is largely rooted in public health and safety concerns.213 While public safety 
concerns serve as the policy justification for an administrative search, the search 
regime itself must still be constitutional. This is where notice comes into play. 
As the court explained in United States v. Hartwell,  
[T]he entire procedure is rendered less offensive—if not less 
intrusive—because air passengers are on notice that they will be 
searched. Air passengers choose to fly, and screening procedures of 
this kind have existed in every airport in the country since at least 
1974. The events of September 11, 2001, have only increased their 
prominence in the public’s consciousness. It is inconceivable that 
Hartwell was unaware that he had to be searched before he could board 
a plane.214 
The court easily justified the search in Hartwell under the administrative 
search doctrine because it was both based on the need to secure public safety 
and provided adequate notice to citizens that a search would occur if they wished 
to board a plane. Importantly, the court acknowledged that while some courts 
have attempted to justify airport searches on the consent doctrine,215 this 
justification is highly illogical.216 In support of this, the court cited Fourth 
 
 208 United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 209 Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2020). 
 210 See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“While the Supreme Court has 
not directly spoken on airport administrative searches, it has discussed them in dicta in two cases.”). 
 211 Id.; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“We reiterate, too, that where the risk to 
public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official 
buildings.”). 
 212 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 213 Id.  
 214 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180–81. 
 215 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Edwards, 
498 F.2d 496, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035, 1036 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 216 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 n.11. 
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Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave’s search and seizure treatise,217 which 
explains that “consent theories are ‘basically unsound’ in the airport context 
because screening systems rarely meet the requirements for express consent 
under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.”218 Bustamonte requires courts to look at the 
totality of the circumstances, including whether an individual knew he could 
refuse the search, when determining if the obtained consent is valid.219 It is 
impossible for a search to be deemed consensual under Bustamonte without an 
inquiry into the circumstances of each search.220 Additionally, “an implied 
consent analysis merely ‘diverts attention from the more fundamental question 
of whether the nature of the regulation undertaken by the government is in fact 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”221 The court intimates that airport 
security searches would be unconstitutional based on implied consent and that 
their constitutionality rests on the administrative search doctrine alone. The 
court’s holdings on airport searches support the idea that notice alone is not 
enough to obtain consent under the Fourth Amendment consent doctrine.  
An implied consent-based rationale is also used in Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence to secure waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights.222 The Court 
held in Mirada v. Arizona that no custodial interrogations are permitted unless 
law enforcement first notifies the arrestee of her Fifth Amendment rights223 and 
obtains a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of these rights.224 In 
Miranda, Chief Justice Warren made clear that a defendant’s valid waiver must 
be express: 
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement 
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could 
constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply 
from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from 
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.225 
He then quoted a particularly apt passage from Carnley v. Cochran,226 in which 
the Court expressly rejected an implied waiver from silence: “Presuming waiver 
 
 217 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 10.6(g) at 
307–09 (4th ed. 2004). 
 218 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181 n.11. 
 219 See supra note 93.  
 220 See supra note 101.  
 221 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181 n.11. 
 222 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 223 Id. at 444. These rights include the right against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right 
to know that their statements may not be used against them in a court of law. Id.  
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 475. 
 226 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). 
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from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be 
an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but 
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not 
waiver.”227 
However, the standards for obtaining a waiver have been relaxed in 
Miranda’s progeny. The first case to recognize an implied waiver to Miranda 
was North Carolina v. Butler.228 In Butler, the Court held that silence, combined 
with a demonstrated understanding of one’s rights, and behavior that indicates a 
willingness to communicate with law enforcement, can serve to effectuate a 
Miranda waiver.229 Thirty-one years later, in Berghuis v. Thompkins,230 the 
Court further diluted the express waiver requirement by holding that if someone 
has full knowledge and understanding of her Miranda rights and chooses not to 
invoke them, an implied waiver can be found.231  
Despite the changing waiver requirements, one thing remains clear 
throughout Miranda jurisprudence: a waiver cannot be effectuated if an arrestee 
is not first notified of her rights. In the realm of Miranda, notification of one’s 
rights is the threshold inquiry before a court can evaluate whether a suspect 
consented to a waiver, either expressly or implicitly. Notification is necessary, 
but far from sufficient to render a Miranda waiver valid.  
These examples are illustrative of courts’ varying and inconsistent 
approaches to the effect of notice on Fourth and Fifth Amendment consent 
validity. Part IV argues that notice-based implied consent theories under the 
Fourth Amendment should create a rebuttable presumption of 
unconstitutionality.  
IV. WHY NOTICE ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO EFFECTUATE VALID 
IMPLIED CONSENT 
Our world is changing in ways that seriously compromise our reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The rapidity with which technology is developing and 
being deployed by both private and public entities has serious consequences for 
how we understand our privacy rights; it has caused us to question what is truly 
private anymore. Though we have always interacted in public, before cameras, 
 
 227 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (quoting Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516). 
 228 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).  
 229 Id. at 369. 
 230 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).  
 231 Id. at 384. 
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facial recognition technology, and biometric data collection, it was a given that 
our face, our gait, and the profile of how we moved was observable, but not able 
to be tracked, traced, collected, and stored. There was no way to scan a face, 
record the data corresponding to the contours of one’s eyes, nose, mouth, and 
bone structure with mathematical certainty, and then store that data in such a 
way that it could be used to identify that person in the future. However, this is 
now our reality.232 Larger normative and policy questions implicated by the 
drastic increase in surveillance and use of tracking technology are important to 
grapple with, but they are beyond the scope of this Comment. Surveillance 
technology is deployed all around us, often without our knowledge and certainly 
without our consent.  
These technologies have permeated our world and, at least early on in their 
inception, flew completely under the legal radar. However, since the use of these 
technologies is now ubiquitous, the law is being forced to catch up. Concerned 
citizens and legislatures have only recently begun developing laws to regulate 
the use of biometric data collection.233 Naturally, considerations of the Fourth 
Amendment and expectations of privacy are essential to the development of 
these laws. At the heart of the debate is our understanding of implied consent 
within the Fourth Amendment, and particularly the role notice plays in this strain 
of jurisprudence. Despite both public and private entities’ attempts to legitimize 
their collection of data using notice to imply consent, this understanding is 
fundamentally at odds with both philosophical and legal conceptions of implied 
consent.  
While technology presents the current threat, government efforts to use 
notice to vitiate Fourth Amendment protections is not a new threat. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall expressed concern in his 1979 dissent in Smith v. 
Maryland,234 worrying about allowing “the government to define the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protections.”235 He pointed specifically to the example of 
“law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their intent to monitor the 
content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations, 
could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such 
 
 232 See generally Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 
773, 818–25 (2015) (“[N]either preexisting statutory frameworks (e.g., surveillance and privacy statutes) nor 
constitutional frameworks (e.g., current Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence), are likely to operate to 
protect against the new types of surveillance harms implicated by emerging biometric data tracking 
technologies.”).  
 233 See supra note 22. 
 234 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 235 Id.  
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communications.”236 His fear was not in vain. As this Comment has discussed, 
two uses of personal data collection—biometric data collection and breath 
testing—and one much more rudimentary instance—tire chalking—provide 
dangerous examples of the government’s attempt to use notice alone to imply 
consent to searches. Regardless of their notice schemes, none of these examples 
should be constitutional under a theory of consent.  
First is the combination of Denver Police Department’s surveillance system, 
HALO, and Morpho Argus, a technology that captures, scans, and stores faces 
picked up by surveillance footage.237 While Denver has not yet merged the 
HALO system with Morpho Argus, the Colorado Bureau of Investigations has 
confirmed its intention to do so.238 This will transform the HALO system from 
one of pure surveillance to one of data capturing and searching, triggering Fourth 
Amendment concerns. Notably, Colorado does not have any laws regulating the 
use of facial recognition technology.239 Throughout Denver, there are signs 
notifying citizens that HALO cameras are in use.240 
The second example raising concern is new parking enforcement practices 
in Bristol, Tennessee, where law enforcement is attempting to glean consent to 
search from notice alone. After the Sixth Circuit held that tire chalking is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, Bristol posted signs stating that if one 
parks in a public spot, she is deemed to have consented to a search for the 
purposes of parking enforcement.241 Although the dangers that stem from a tire 
chalking search seem far less serious than storing biometric data, the principles 
of the Fourth Amendment’s consent doctrine are offended nonetheless. Finally, 
DUI implied consent laws claim to secure drivers’ consent from notice provided 
via statute. The act of procuring a driver’s license serves as the necessary “act” 
to trigger the implication of consent, regardless of whether one is actually aware 
of the statute or that she is consenting. 
In all three of these examples, the state is attempting to gain consent to search 
based exclusively on notice. If challenged, the state’s justification would 
presumably be that the signage provided notice, and that by engaging in the 
specified act, the individual consented to the terms of the search. And yet, under 
 
 236 Id.  
 237 See Robertson, supra note 5. 
 238 Id.  
 239 But see Esteban Hernandez, A Proposed Denver Law Would Ban Police from Using Facial Recognition 
Technology, DENVERITE (Sept. 4, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://denverite.com/2019/09/04/a-potential-denver-law-
would-ban-law-enforcement-from-using-facial-recognition-technology/. 
 240 Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11. 
 241 Lipton, supra note 7. 
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either the general consent exception or the pervasively regulated industries 
exception to the Fourth Amendment, notice alone is not enough to imply consent 
as it does not meet the requirements of either framework.  
A. Notice and the General Consent Exception 
Under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, 
in determining whether officers obtained valid consent to search, courts look to 
indication, authority, voluntariness, and scope.242 Additionally, valid consent 
must be revocable243 and is assessed based on the totality of the 
circumstances.244 Laws attempting to use notice alone to obtain consent do not 
meet these requirements for five especially salient reasons.  
First, when the state uses notice alone, particularly through posting a sign 
specifying that performing a certain act will result in consent to a particular 
thing, there is likely not the necessary indication required by the consent 
doctrine. While indication can be a low bar, it almost always requires some level 
of affirmative action in response to the attempt to acquire consent.245 For 
example, when X is asked by officers if they can search her home, an affirmative 
nod or the act of stepping aside and gesturing into the home would be considered 
indication of consent.246 However, actions in response to a posted sign assuming 
consent based on that specified action cannot absolutely and necessarily be 
considered an indication of consent. For example, in the case of a parking sign 
stating that by parking in public spots, one consents to her tires being chalked, 
an individual who did not see the sign but parked in the spot cannot be said to 
have indicated consent; she was utterly unaware of the state’s attempt to gain 
her consent in the first place. Someone who did see the sign and parked in the 
spot can arguably be perceived as indicating consent, but the sign along with the 
specified action cannot automatically serve as indication of consent. The attempt 
to garner consent from the HALO camera “warnings” is even more indefensible. 
Since these cameras will be gathering the data of those present in public 
spaces,247 there is certainly no act that can qualify as granting consent. Simply 
being present in a public space makes no affirmative statement regarding 
 
 242 See supra Part II.C.1.a. 
 243 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991).  
 244 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 245 See supra note 84.  
 246 United States v. Faler, 832 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding implied consent where the officer 
asked, “mind if we come in?”, and in response the apartment tenant “opened the door wider, moved out of the 
way, and the officers entered”). 
 247 Const. Project’s Task Force on Facial Recognition Surveillance & Jake Laperruque, supra note 15. 
TOMKOVICZPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:09 PM 
2020] UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICE 191 
consent to search and gather data. As to DUI implied consent laws, the “notice” 
is provided through statute.248 There can be no behavior indicating consent if 
someone is not aware of the statute in the first place, and thus, completely 
unaware that her procurement of a driver’s license is serving as indication of 
consent.  
Second, the voluntariness requirement poses an impossible hurdle to 
governments hoping to effectuate consent from notice alone. Voluntariness is 
the philosophical bedrock of consent and as such, “obstacles to voluntary choice, 
if inexorable, will compromise the usefulness of consent theory as a descriptive 
map and normative guide.”249 In the Fourth Amendment context, we know that 
voluntary consent does not require the government to inform an individual of 
her right to refuse; rather, knowledge of the right to refuse is just one factor in 
the totality of circumstances analysis.250 Additionally, Carpenter tells us that 
performing acts that are innocent and largely inescapable in modern life, like 
owning and using a cell phone, will likely not be considered voluntary.251 While 
these fundamental acts are performed voluntarily in the philosophical sense, it 
is dishonest and disingenuous to suggest that their performance amounts to 
voluntary consent.  
Whether specific acts are considered an inescapable part of modern life is 
certainly debatable, and parking in public spaces, for example, toes the line. On 
the one hand, the ability to park publicly on the city streets is an inescapable part 
of modern life, especially in commuter-heavy cities. It enables residents to use 
the streets for which their tax dollars pay, to run necessary errands, to patronize 
community businesses, and to engage with fellow citizens in the public square. 
On the other hand, the ability to use public transportation or to park in private 
lots makes parking publicly less “inescapable.” Ultimately, public parking is 
more akin to the use of a cellphone—while its use is not absolutely necessary to 
survive, it is so convenient and common as to be virtually necessary to function 
effectively in society.  
While conditioning parking on consent is debatably voluntary, implying 
consent to gather one’s biometric data in public places based on notice via a 
posted sign certainly is not. Imagine, for example, someone walking to the 
grocery store or the Department of Motor Vehicles on the public streets. She 
looks up and sees a sign reading, “Attention: By being present on these streets, 
 
 248 Voas, supra note 20. 
 249 Herzog, supra note 35, at 1674. 
 250 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1973). 
 251 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).  
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you are consenting to the collection of your biometric data.” The use of public 
streets and spaces is certainly an inescapable, necessary part of modern life. 
There is also no realistic way to hide the majority of one’s biometric data—
wearing a mask or changing one’s gait is not a realistic alternative to exposing 
one’s biometric data publicly. Therefore, implying consent based on presence in 
public is not valid because it is not truly voluntary.  
DUI implied consent laws raise interesting questions of voluntariness. In 
fact, much ink has been spilled over the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
which holds that “[the] government may not grant a benefit on the condition that 
the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may 
withhold that benefit altogether.”252 Conditioning a driver’s license, a necessity 
to modern life, on the surrender of Fourth Amendment rights vitiates any 
legitimate claim to voluntariness. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to hold 
these statutes constitutional.253 In all three recent implied consent law cases, the 
Court has refused to validate the searches on implied consent grounds, despite 
the implied consent statutes in place.254 
The third reason that notice alone is insufficient to validate a search on 
consent grounds is that implying consent through notice is not revocable. As the 
Court stated in Jardines, implied licenses (which are the functional equivalent 
of implied consent) must be revocable.255 While there is debate about what 
serves as successful revocation of the implied license,256 the ability to revoke is 
necessary. In the parking example, an individual could possibly revoke the 
implied consent by placing a sign on her car expressly revoking any consent the 
city attempts to garner.257 In the biometric data collection case, there is no ability 
to revoke. While the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to notify an 
individual of her right to revoke consent, some state constitutions do require 
such notification before consent to search can be obtained.258 Revocability is a 
 
 252 Sullivan, supra note 193 (“It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly 
what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to 
impose a condition on its receipt.”).  
 253 See supra Part II.C.1.e.  
 254 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 164 (2013) (holding unconstitutional a forcible, warrantless 
blood test despite the state’s implied consent laws); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016) 
(holding a blood test unconstitutional pursuant to the arrest of the individual, despite implied consent laws); 
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2526 (2019) (finding a blood test of an unconscious driver constitutional 
based on the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment, not implied consent).  
 255 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013). 
 256 See supra note 125. 
 257 For an interesting and entertaining look at an operationalized attempt to help individuals revoke 
consent, see FOURTH AMEND. SEC., https://fourthamendmentsecurity.com.  
 258 Fern Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits 
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crucial feature of valid implied consent since it rests on the idea of a voluntary 
choice and a communicated mental state. A person can change her mind, and 
once the mind has been changed and that has been communicated, there is no 
longer the consent necessary to premise a search on consent. In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that consent is no longer valid when officers interfere with a 
suspect’s ability to revoke her consent.259 Consequently, the impossibility of 
revoking consent in searches premised on notice deems implied consent an 
invalid theory.  
Scope presents a fourth hurdle to using notice alone to unequivocally imply 
consent. Because consenters can set the scope of the search to which they are 
consenting,260 it is doctrinally unsound to force a uniform scope of consent upon 
each consenter. For example, one can consent to a search of her kitchen and 
living space, but not her bedroom. The parking example is largely about the 
scope of the license a motorist gives parking enforcement to monitor her car 
while parked. Under Jardines, it is possible that a court would reject a theory of 
implied consent in this situation because there is “no customary invitation”261 to 
allow officers to chalk car tires. The question then becomes whether the city can 
change the nature of the driver’s implied license by posting a sign. If a court 
answered this question in the affirmative, it would be saying that the state can 
turn a trespass search into a reasonable search by virtue of a posted sign. This 
approach is fundamentally contrary to the reasoning in Jardines and Jimeno, 
which both focus on the implied license stemming from expectations of how 
everyday citizens, not law enforcement, interact with each other.262 
Additionally, this is exactly the type of state action Justice Marshall warned 
against in Smith v. Maryland.263 An implied license cannot extend to law 
enforcement only, so, although narrow in the parking context, a sign cannot 
create an implied license that extends to officers only.  
Implied licenses extending identically to public and private entities is an 
approach supported by William Baude and James Stern in their article, The 
 
Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515 (2006). 
 259 See United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1036–37 (holding that if the officers coerced 
defendants into believing that they did not have the ability to withdraw their consent to the search, this was a 
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights). 
 260 See supra Part II.C.1.d. 
 261 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 2 (2013).  
 262 See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 1–2; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249–51 (1991). 
 263 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[L]aw enforcement officials, 
simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone 
conversations, could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such 
communications.”). 
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Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment.264 Baude and Stern argue for an 
entirely new approach to the Fourth Amendment265 that does not look to privacy 
as the source of Fourth Amendment protection, but rather looks to citizens’ 
expectations of privacy based exclusively on protections derived from private 
law.266 According to Baude and Stern, 
Instead of making Fourth Amendment protection hinge on whether it 
is “reasonable” to expect privacy in a given situation, a court should 
ask whether government officials have engaged in an investigative act 
that would be unlawful for a similarly situated private actor to perform. 
That is, stripped of official authority, has the government actor done 
something that would be tortious, criminal, or otherwise a violation of 
some legal duty? Fourth Amendment protection, in other words, is 
warranted when government officials either violate generally 
applicable law or avail themselves of a governmental exemption from 
it.267 
Under the positive law model, the parking signs, the biometric data-
gathering, and DUI implied consent laws would violate Fourth Amendment 
protection. In all three of these cases, the government is far exceeding the scope 
of what is legal for an ordinary citizen to do without a warrant, and according to 
Baude and Stern, that is the linchpin for valid searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.268  
The fifth problem with gleaning consent based on notice alone is the court’s 
insistence on evaluating consent based on the totality of the circumstances.269 
Evaluating consent individually in each case and on the totality of the 
circumstances creates an important bulwark against the all-powerful state. The 
courts recognize time and again that the particular circumstances under which 
an individual consents to law enforcement requests are crucially important to the 
validity of the consent itself.270 The McGann Court named seven factors 
 
 264 William Baude & James Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1821, 1823 (2016). 
 265 Id. at 1825.  
 266 Id. at 1823 (“In short, Fourth Amendment protection should depend on property law, privacy torts, 
consumer laws, eavesdropping and wiretapping legislation, anti-stalking statutes, and other provisions of law 
generally applicable to private actors, rather than a freestanding doctrine of privacy fashioned by courts on the 
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 267 Id. at 1825–26 (2016). 
 268 Id.  
 269 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 218 (1973); McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 
8 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 270 See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218; McGann, 8 F.3d at 1178. 
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specifically,271 but the crucial holding was that each factor needs to be assessed 
in each case—no one factor is dispositive in finding implied consent. If the state 
were to try and imply consent based off of a sign alone, this would violate 
precedent and completely vitiate the individual inquiry based on the totality of 
the circumstances requirement. Courts finding that notice alone suffices to imply 
consent could allow the government to engage in extremely bold invasions of 
privacy, all premised on a simple sign posted in public areas.  
Claiming that notice alone effectuates implied consent without any further 
inquiry into the individual circumstances of a case is nothing short of pure 
“fiction.”272 The most obvious example highlighting the importance of 
individual inquiry is an instance where someone did not see a posted sign, either 
because she was distracted or because she could not see. If the court were to 
adopt the government’s implied consent theory, a sign alone would trigger her 
“consent” to the specified action, despite her having absolutely no idea that she 
had “consented.” While this is only one example, there are many potential 
instances where notice might not have actually served its purpose in notifying; 
thus, implying consent premised on the notice and nothing more is absurd. 
Notice cannot provide blanket consent and eliminate the need for courts to 
engage in an individual inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances.  
B. Notice and the Administrative Search and Pervasively Regulated Industries 
Exceptions  
A second route by which the government could attempt to justify notice 
alone serving to effectuate implied consent is through the administrative search 
and pervasively regulated industries exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. 
These exceptions apply to both government and commercial entities with a 
history of regulation, a consistency of regulation, and engagement in work with 
an important public health and safety component.273 Analyzing these exceptions 
highlights important differences between the parking sign example, the 
biometric data-gathering example, and DUI consent laws. Taking the parking 
sign and biometric data-gathering examples together, they simply do not meet 
 
 271 McGann, 8 F.3d at 1181 (holding that “[g]enerally, in deciding whether to uphold a warrantless search 
on the basis of implied consent, courts consider whether (1) the person searched was on notice that undertaking 
certain conduct, like attempting to enter a building or board an airplane, would subject him to a search, (2) the 
person voluntarily engaged in the specified conduct, (3) the search was justified by a vital interest, (4) the search 
was reasonably effective in securing the interests at stake, (5) the search was only as intrusive as necessary to 
further the interests justifying the search[,] and (6) the search curtailed, to some extent, unbridled discretion in 
the searching officers”). 
 272 See supra note 133.  
 273 See supra text accompanying notes 135–42. 
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the requirements of these exceptions. While there is arguably a history of 
regulation when it comes to monitoring cars for parking enforcement, the same 
cannot be said of collecting and storing biometric data. And while the biometric 
data gathering might be consistent, the same cannot be said of parking 
enforcement searches. Finally, neither of these searches is premised on the 
triggering rationale: furthering health and public safety.274 It is difficult to 
imagine a situation where parking enforcement poses enough of a threat to 
public safety that courts would consider it under these exceptions. Additionally, 
while gathering biometric data could be justified as a means of securing public 
safety, the method by which these systems work casts much too wide a net. 
These doctrines apply to business-owners and government entities performing 
very particular searches.275 It does not apply to broad and general law 
enforcement searches for safety purposes. In fact, these types of searches are 
exactly the searches from which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect 
against.  
DUI implied consent laws, on the other hand, force uniform consent upon 
any individual that obtains a driver’s license. While these searches meet the 
history of search, consistency of search, and public safety requirements of the 
administrative search and pervasively regulated industries exceptions, they are 
conducted by law enforcement officers for criminal enforcement purposes. 
These factors are threshold requirements for these exceptions. Additionally, and 
most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, DUI implied consent laws 
do not provide the necessary notice. If a driver’s license applicant is not aware 
of the statute, the idea that her procurement of the license indicated her consent 
is entirely fictitious. These three examples demonstrate why notice alone cannot 
serve to garner the consent necessary to search under the Fourth Amendment, 
using neither the theory of consent nor administrative search. However, this 
Comment argues that a consent theory may be justified if the state meets a robust 
set of requirements, including meaningful notice.  
 
 274 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2019). Notably, Saginaw tried to argue that 
parking poses a threat to public safety, but this argument was vehemently rejected by the Sixth Circuit. “[O]n 
these facts, the City fails to demonstrate how this search bears a relation to public safety. The City does not show 
that the location or length of time that Taylor’s vehicle was parked created the type of ‘hazard’ or traffic 
impediment amounting to a public safety concern. Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a search would 
result in injury or ongoing harm to the community . . . . No similar ongoing public disturbance exists here to 
justify a warrantless search.” Id.  
 275 See supra text accompanying notes 135–38. 
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V. DRAWING THE LINE: WHEN IS NOTICE “ENOUGH?” 
This Comment does not suggest that there are absolutely no circumstances 
under which the state can use notice to generate implied consent. Rather, it 
argues that those circumstances should be extremely limited, and a court should 
be highly suspicious and skeptical toward the state’s attempts to use a notice-
based implied consent rationale. Courts should be wary of attempts to expand 
any warrant exception when the justification is based on notice effectuating 
implied consent. Notice should be enough to effectuate implied consent in an 
extremely limited set of circumstances. Borrowing from the pervasively 
regulated industries exception, four elements should each be met before a court 
finds notice alone sufficient to generate implied consent: tradition of search, 
consistency of search, revocability of consent, and most importantly, furthering 
of public safety. In fact, when accompanied by these four elements, the notice 
itself simply ensures individuals are aware of an already robust search scheme.  
First, courts should look for a tradition or history of search. A tradition of a 
particular search taking place creates an expectation for future individuals that, 
in a particular situation, a search will take place. This expectation allows 
individuals to conform their behavior to those expectations. Knowing one is 
likely going to be subjected to a search changes one’s expectations of privacy. 
In other words, it reduces our expectation of privacy in that situation, which is a 
key inquiry when evaluating the reasonableness of a search. A lesser expectation 
of privacy makes a search more likely to be reasonable, or, not a search at all.276  
Second, a search scheme should be highly consistent for notice to be an 
effective form of garnering implied consent. Consistency is a hallmark of the 
pervasively regulated industries exception. If a search is conducted in a highly 
regular, predictable fashion, it will reduce an individual’s expectations of 
privacy in that particular situation. Consistency and regularity eliminate 
uncertainty. For example, if a search scheme is in place, but rarely enforced, it 
may not actually reduce an individual’s expectation of privacy because it is 
natural to assume that a search will not actually take place. However, if every 
single time one subjects herself to the situation in which the search scheme is in 
place, the search actually takes place, then one’s expectation of privacy is 
necessarily reduced. She knows, with certainty, that that situation will lead to a 
search. Such predictability, combined with an individual voluntarily subjecting 
 
 276 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 207 (1986).  
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herself to the particular situation, eliminates any claim that individual may have 
had to her privacy.  
Third, the implied consent must be revocable. Because the scope of the 
search must be able to be limited by the consenter, the consenter must be aware 
of the exact circumstances under which the search will occur to be able to 
properly consent and to potentially revoke consent to a search. Therefore, notice 
cannot claim to effectuate implied consent to a search that is not imminent. This 
is one reason DUI implied consent laws should be void. A statute claiming to 
imply consent to a breathalyzer in exchange for a driver’s license is too 
attenuated to the actual search, should it ever even occur. These statutes also 
frequently impose criminal sanctions for revoking the implied consent.277 
Imposing criminal sanctions as a punishment for revocation renders this 
“consent” practically and functionally irrevocable. It strains credulity to claim 
that one can truly revoke her consent if that revocation comes with criminal 
sanctions, including potential jail time. 
Fourth, and most importantly, a search scheme attempting to use notice to 
garner implied consent must be rooted in legitimate and specific public safety 
goals. The government, and law enforcement officials specifically, bear the 
burden of protecting the public and controlling crime. On the one hand, safe 
environments allow cities and their citizens to flourish. On the other hand, 
officers’ pursuit of public safety goals is constrained by citizens’ right to privacy 
and non-interference in their daily lives. This balance is at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment. Law enforcement officers are at their peak power when taking 
actions objectively aimed at maintaining public safety.278 This is the essence of 
their purpose. In fact, many campus police forces are referred to as 
“Department(s) of Public Safety.” Regardless of how traditional or predictable 
a search scheme is, if it is not designed to further public safety, then it simply 
cannot be important enough to compromise the protections guaranteed to us by 
the Fourth Amendment.279  
 
 277 See Refusing to Take a Breathalyzer Test, ALCOHOL.ORG, https://www.alcohol.org/dui/breathalyzer/ 
(“Laws still vary greatly by state. In some states, refusing a [portable breathalyzer test] is a misdemeanor that is 
punishable by a fine and/or up to 90 days in jail.”). 
 278 Jeremiah Mosteller, The Role of Police in America, CHARLES KOCH INST., https://www. 
charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-policing-reform/role-of-police-in-america/ (“The purpose 
of law enforcement in a free society is to promote public safety and uphold the rule of law so that individual 
liberty may flourish.”). 
 279 In Taylor v. City of Saginaw, the government argued that enforcing parking limits was a public safety 
goal. See 922 F.3d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 2019). “Not only does this regulation facilitate convenience for City drivers, 
it also promotes public safety through the orderly movement and parking of traffic (among numerous other 
significant purposes).” Defendants-Appellees’ Brief on Appeal at 16, Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 22 F.3d 328 
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A prime example of when signs provide the robust notice to effectuate 
implied consent is in the airport search context. As we enter the airport, we 
immediately see signs directing us toward security checkpoints. While waiting 
in line to pass through security, we see TSA signs notifying us that a search will 
be conducted. Additionally, the forthcoming search is not a surprise. Why? 
Security searches at airports have been in place for decades.280 We have 
encountered them since we were children, seen them portrayed on television 
shows, or discussed on the news. We know that buying a plane ticket will subject 
us to a particular TSA search. These searches are consistent and predictable. No 
one is immune from search and the searches are not waivable. TSA conducts a 
search of each and every individual, every single time she boards a commercial 
flight. The tradition and consistency of search make the notification signage 
almost superfluous. Further, commercial flight poses uniquely grave public 
safety threats. Flights carry hundreds of passengers, through the air for 
thousands of miles, siloed off from police officers and offering no escape to 
passengers, should something go wrong. The safety stakes are about as high as 
they get, and enforcing public safety via a traditional, predictable, consistent 
search is necessary. The notice of search given to passengers prior to security 
checkpoints meets the requirements proposed by this Comment to effectuate 
valid implied consent to search under the Fourth Amendment. In a situation that 
does not meet all four requirements, the government cannot conduct a search 
pursuant to the consent exception, regardless of notice or signage claiming to 
effectuate implied consent.  
CONCLUSION 
Consent is a concept as old as time. Granting permission for others to act 
toward you in a particular way is not a new rationale, nor is it philosophically 
distinct in the Fourth Amendment context. However, because of the power 
dynamic between citizens and the state, it is imperative that society and the 
courts protect against the state’s abuse of its power in an effort to garner consent, 
specifically implied consent. This Comment argues that notice alone, 
particularly through the use of signage, creates a rebuttable presumption against 
courts finding valid implied consent under the Fourth Amendment. The state 
 
(6th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2126). However, this is an objective inquiry that was rejected by the Sixth Circuit. 
Taylor, 922 F.3d at 335. 
 280 While there was a dramatic increase in flight security in terms of both invasiveness and frequency of 
search after the September 11, 2001 attacks, there was some form of passenger searches, although less 
consistently than today, since the 1970’s. See Bryan Gardiner, Off with Your Shoes: A Brief History of Airport 
Security, WIRED (June 14, 2013, 6:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/fa_planehijackings/. 
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cannot claim to make an unconstitutional search constitutional simply by 
declaring it to be so.  
As technology rapidly advances, it becomes increasingly important to 
regulate the circumstances under which we allow the government to track, 
monitor, and collect our personal information. Yet the government’s attempt to 
use signage alone to effectuate consent is not isolated to the technological 
sphere: as the City of Bristol’s response to the tire-chalking case demonstrates, 
states are capable of using their unique power to create implied consent in 
myriad situations. In fact, DUI implied consent laws are the most common use 
of this method of creating implied consent to search. However, there is no 
warrant exception that justifies this method of garnering consent—not the 
general consent exception, nor the administrative search exception, nor the 
pervasively regulated industries exception. Courts should remain wary of this 
potential abuse of government power and strike down alleged implied consent-
based Fourth Amendment searches when notice alone is the foundation on which 
the “consent” rests. However, when the government’s search scheme creates 
robust notice—including a history of search, consistency of search, the ability 
to revoke consent, and the furthering of public safety goals—courts should be 
willing to entertain an argument that the notice, particularly via signage, created 
the necessary implied consent to justify a warrantless search. Only then can the 
Fourth Amendment continue to be the bulwark against abuse of state power, 
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